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Abstract

In 2008, the US faced a worst financial crisis. From 2002
to 2006, the housing prices in the United States grew
substantially which was driven by speculation. This
sustained asset price inflation generated excessive
optimism. This induced investors to engage in the
practice of leveraging for which they borrowed
excessively forming a housing bubble. In 2007, this
housing bubble burst which led to failure to pay
mortgage, financial markets crashing, and banks
deleveraging causing a financial crisis. To prevent a
financial crisis in the future, it became important for the
Federal Reserve to identify the cause of the crisis. This
paper explores whether the credit boom was demand
driven or supply driven using macroeconomic data.
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To test my thesis, I have used several macroeconomic variables from 2003-2015 for all 50 states. For this, I
have used Panel Data. The frequency of these observations is annual. Panel data allows heterogeneity across
states during the same time period. The years 2007-2009 of the crisis are placed well in the middle of this
timeline to ensure that the trends are clear. This allows us to see regional disparities of the crisis in terms of the
state. The dataset employs various macroeconomic factors which determine the causes of the shift in the credit
growth. I chose the House Price Index, Default Rates and Mortgages as my dependent variables. Then I chose
Personal Income, Debt to Income Ratio, Credit Card Default Rates, Total Debt, and Unemployment as my
independent variables or factors which determine the credit worthiness of individuals buying houses, defaulting
on loans, or taking out mortgages. Other variables that I included were rent, and interest rates and tested the
effects of these variables on my dependent variables. I ran both fixed and random effects for each model. I then
ran a Hausman Test to determine whether I should be using fixed or random effects.

Models
Model 1: CREDIT WORTHINESS MODEL
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒
= 𝛼𝑖 +𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 )𝛽1 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜2,𝑖𝑡 𝛽2 + 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒3,𝑖𝑡 𝛽3 + 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡4,𝑖𝑡 𝛽4
+ 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡5,𝑖𝑡 𝛽5 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
Model 2: RENT MODEL
𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +𝑙𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 𝛽 + +𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
Model 3: DEFAULT RATE MODEL
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡+ + 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
Model 4: MORTGAGE MODEL
𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡

Motivation

Limitations

The cause of the financial crisis has important policy
implications. Policymakers cannot do much to curb
speculative investment, but they can restrain bank credit
expansion through the macroprudential policy.

It is hard to firmly conclude whether it was the supply or demand side. It is possible that both are true, or one
played off the other. We do not what percentage of the mortgages had 15-to-30-year fixed interest and what
percentage was variable interest rate which varied over time. We cannot conclude to what extent did the
interest rates impact the defaults on mortgages. We have made a lot of assumptions in our models. If we drop
these assumptions, we could have different results.

Conclusion
The quantity of mortgages per capita began increased in the years prior to the crisis
indicating that the mortgages rose significantly before the crisis. Default rates on
mortgages continued to grow substantially during the crisis, peaking in 2009. Interest
rates peaked prior to the crisis which may have led to higher default rates. Total Debt
was building up prior to the crisis. Rent steadily increased with no significant spikes.
This indicates that there was no improvement in fundamentals, but house prices still
increased which indicates that there was a bubble. Personal Income remained steady
over the years yet house prices rose prior to the crisis.
House Prices experienced the highest increase from 2006 to 2007 when controlling for
factors of credit worthiness. When interest rates increased, default rates also increased.
This change was the highest from 2008 to 2009. This indicates that interest rates had a
role to play in the increase of default rates. The most significant outcome that we notice
is that while controlling for the factors of credit worthiness, the most significant increase
has been from 2003 to 2004.
The answer to the question “Was the credit growth during the 2008 financial crisis
supply or demand driven?” remains inconclusive given the variables and regressions
that have been used in my thesis. However, it is true that both scenarios might be at
play in the crisis, or one might be influencing more strongly than the other. However, in
my models, it does seem like the credit growth might be demand driven. Most variables
that encompass credit worthiness do not seem to be showing any unexpected results
which would prove otherwise. Yet, we can’t rule the supply scenario out.

